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INTRODUCTION

This declaratory judgment action has always centered on one
issue: does the policy extend State Farm.' s owner's or operator's
c o v e r a g e t: o C1 1 a d C h r i s t e n s e n ?

11 :J :i t: s 3: :i : :i • = f

S t: a t: e • F a r n: i t: r i e s t: • :

cloud the issue with arguments on standing and issue preservation.
Yet;

the

fact

remains., when

a policy

is not

clear

it must

be

i n t e r p r e t e d s t :i : :i c 13 ;; * a g a i n s t t h e :i i 1 s i 11: e i a i i ::i :i i ] f al: > c • r : f :: ::1; r erage
Accordingly; the judgment for State Farm should be reversed,
and judgment entered in favor of defendants. 1

ARGUMENT
POINT I
EGELSTON HAS STAMPING TO CHALLENGE STATE FARM'S
INTERPRETATION OF CHRISTENSEN'S POLICY
State Farm, sued Egelston in order to bind her to the declarator \
have

ji ldg i: ii: tei it
standing

to

H : • ; \/e^ rer
argue

lie > i :i 1: assei: I::s 1::]: lat Egel ston d :: es • ' t

constr uction

of

tl le policy.

This

is

-State Farm maintains that Egelston has changed her position
and is arguing that there are disputed issues of fact precluding
summary judgment.
That is inaccurate.
Egelston argues that,
because the policy is ambiguous and State Farm introduced no
extrinsic evidence, the policy must be construed in favor of
coverage. See Br. of Appellant, pp. 9-10. Of course, this Court
has the discretion to decide that neither party is entitled to
summary judgment even on cross-motions. See Amiacs Interwest, Inc.
v. Design Assoc., 635 P.2d 53, 55 (Utah 1 9 8 1 ) .
1

certainly an interesting position.

Essentially, State Farm would

have Egelston bound by the judgment but gagged to participate.
A.

Egelston Is A Proper Party.
State Farm contends that Egelston is a proper party to this

action.

Yet, Utah law is clear. An injured victim is not a proper

party to a declaratory judgment action by a liability
against its insured.

insurer

Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Chugg, 315 P.2d

277, 6 Utah 2d 399 (Utah 1957) . In support of its position, State
Farm cites Justice Zimmerman's non-binding concurring opinion in
Republic Ins. Group v. Doman, 774 P.2d 1130, 1131-32

(Utah App.

1989) .

There, Justice Zimmerman stated that to obtain the real

benefit

of

a declaratory

include the injured party.

judgment
Id.

action,

the

insurer

should

However, that concurring opinion

conflicts with the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Chugg, which
remains controlling.
In Chugg, an insurer filed a declaratory

judgment

action

against its insured and a third person injured by the insured.
at 4 01.

Id.

As to such declaratory judgment actions, the Court stated:
. . . we want to repel any inference which may
be drawn from this opinion that one who claims
to be damaged by the negligent act of another,
is a proper party to an action by the insurer
of the latter under a public liability policy,
whereby a declaratory judgment is sought
declaring the legal effect of the terms of
such policy.
•

*

2

*

The transaction involved in this action, is one
between the insurer and insured, namely their
contract.
Such contract can be construed
without reference to any liability having
accrued thereunder.
This being so, there is
no issue of law or fact in common between the
insurer and the plaintiff;
or potential
plaintiff, to a tort action against the
insured. The tort victim has no present legal
interest in the insurance contract.
To drag
him into the declaratory judgment action is to
import into it a totally different controversy, and to assert that there are issues of
law or fact in common.
Id.

at. 4 06.
Nevertheless,

bpec i 11 c d i i y , M

the

Court

decided

Chugg

i"'ii

the

merits.

ne j i.i LIia i. ai L 11uuy11 111tj .i 11 j ui ed pe L son was not a

proper party, he had not objected to being joined and was, thus,
subject to thp jurisdiction nf the

courts,

The Court

concluded:

[I] i i this suit the trial court h a s j u r i s d i c t i o n of the subject m a t t e r and since L a r s e n
failed to object to h i s j o i n d e r as a p a r t y in
that suit and the issue w a s triable u p o n the
a p p e a l b e i n g t a k e n , the i s s u e s were p r o p e r l y
b e f o r e u s for review.
Id. at 4 0 6 .
Hei e, Ege 1 s toi l 1 la s i ic«t obj ect ed t :: 1: • = • :i i l g j c • :i i leci
Court could proceed to determine her rights, just as the

T'i n LS

t:he

Chugg

court determined the injured parties' rights.
B,

A Party Can Address Any Issue As To Which She Would Be Bound
By The Result.
Although State Farm agrees that Egelston i s enough of a. party

to be boui id 1: ;; a judgment, ^ :i 1: wai its • t : • , = ilence 1: lei ai g umei its .

Doing that would contravene the most basic concepts of fundamental
fairness.

A party cannot be bound by a judgment in the absence of

having a full and fair opportunity to litigate.
City v.

Silver Fork Pipeline.

913 P.2d

See, Salt Lake

731, 733

(Utah 1995) .

Indeed, the opportunity to be heard is an essential component of
due process of law.

See e.q., International Resources v. Dunfield,

599 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah 1979).

Thus, if Egelston is a party, she

has the right to fully participate.

Otherwise, this Court must

conclude that Egelston is not a proper party and that the judgment
must be vacated as to her.
In a strikingly similar case, where the insurer also argued
that a stranger to the contract could not contest its construction,
the Michigan Supreme Court held:
. . . Allstate named the injured party as an
interested party in order to obtain a binding
declaration regarding coverage. By initiating
the declaratory judgment action and naming the
injured persons as defendants, the insurance
company should be deemed to have consented to
a determination in that action of all matters
that might be at issue between it and those
persons arising from the controversy in
question. By naming [the injured party] as an
interested party, Allstate has consented to a
determination
of
the
coverage
question.
Allstate cannot complain about that determination on the basis of a lack of standing.
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Haves, 499 N.W.2d 743 (Mich. 1993) (citation
omitted).
Two federal courts have also said that it is anomalous to hold
that an actual controversy exists between the insurer and injured
4

party, but deny the injured party's right to participate. See
Federal Kemper Ins. Co. v. Rauscher, 807 F 2 d 34 5 , 35 3 (3rd C i r.
1986) (citii IQ Hawkeve-Security Ins.. Co. v
177 (7th Cir. 1962)1

Schulte, 302 F 2d 1 ; 1,

In Kemper, the court quoted Hawkeve-Security

and held:
Appellee [ti le ii lsurance company] vo iuntarily
brought the appellant [the injured party] into
this litigation as a party defendant. [The
injured party] being a proper party to an
actual controversy with [the insurance company] , should be heard to assert any proper
defense raised by his answer to the complaint.
(Emphasis added.) Kemper at 177; Hawkeve at
353 .
The Colorado Supreme Court has recerr" y stated:
j t w a s therefore proper for [zne insurer] to
name [the injured party] as a party defendant
and, once joined, [the injured party] may
fully participate in. the action
(Emphasis
added.)
•

•

Hence, we conclude that
allegedlyinjured party in the underlying action may
defend an anticipatory judgment as long as the
action is properly initiated by a party with a
legally cognizable claim.
Constitution Assoc, v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 93 0 P.2d 55 6, 562
(Colo. 1997).
State

Farm

makes

the

equally

interesting

argument

that

Ege1ston cannot question i ts construction o£ the po 1 icy because
" [i i] e i t h e r the insurer [State Farm.] nor tl HE insured

[Christensen]

have raised issue as to the terms of the insurance contract " Br.

5

of Appellee, p. 4.
judgment
appeal."

State Farm notes that Christensen "has allowed

to be taken against him, without

opposition and with

Id.

If anything,

Christensen's passivity

compels, rather

precludes, having Egelston argue in favor of coverage.

than

If the

insured lies down and the injured party is gagged, there is not
much of an adjudicable controversy.

Indeed, in circumstances such

as these, where the insured refuses to take a position, the court
should be very cautious about granting summary judgment for the
insurer because of the real potential for collusion between insured
and insurer.2
proper party,

Although it is not clear whether Egelston is a
State Farm's position

is in error.

Either the

injured person is a proper party or they are not.

If they are

proper, they can raise any valid defense.

If not, summary judgment

cannot be entered against her.
POINT II
THE ISSUE TO BE DECIDED IN THIS CASE WAS
PROPERLY RESERVED BELOW
State Farm argues that

"[t]he issue of ambiguity was not

raised in the trial court, and cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal."

The issue here has always been construing the policy--

2

Christensen's attorney, here, has been provided by State
Farm. One must wonder why Christensen did not just stipulate to
State Farm's interpretation. Then again, perhaps, that would have
been going too far.
6

specifically,

whether

the

insurance

contract

was

an "owner's"

policy or an "operator's policy" (or, both or neither) . This issue
was preserved and acknowledged by the trial court judge:
THE COURT:

. . . The issue before the
Court is whether or not the
policy in question is either an
owner's policy or an operator's
policy
pursuant
to
the
definitions or the guidelines
set forth in the statute as
well as case law.

(March 5, 1997 Transcript at p. 4.)
Ambiguity is simply one of many rules of construction which
might be utilized to answer the core issue described by the judge
above.

See U.S. Fidelity and Guarantee Co. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519,

521 & 523 (Utah 1993) (liability turns upon the policy language and
"the rules of construction that apply to insurance policies. . . .
[I]f an ambiguity arises, the rules of construction outlined above
must be employed").
Additionally, although the word "ambiguity" was not specifically used in the trial court, the parties argued at length about
the unclear nature of State Farm's policy and the application of
the rules of construction (March 5, 1997 Transcript of pp. 10-15).
As Egelston's attorney stated:
The initial problems that we face is one of
the statutes not defining what an owner's or
operator's policy is, and also the fact that
the policy itself does not define itself as an
owner's policy. So we're left with looking at

7

the content of both the policy and of the law
to determine what it is.
(R. 231-236.)
At most, Egelston is simply presenting a more specific and
better-supported

argument

as to the issue, which was

presented and decided below.
new issue.

appeal.

That is not the same as presenting a

It is not inappropriate

for an appellant

to refocus

squarely

(and sometimes is advisable)

arguments

and

change

emphasis

on

That is all that has been done here.

Even if "ambiguity" was a new issue (which it is not), this
Court has discretion to consider it.

See Colorado Interstate v.

Cit. Group/Equipment Fin., 993 F.2d 743, 751

(10th Cir. 1993).

("the matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the
first time on appeal is one left primarily to the discretion of the
court of appeals, to be exercised
cases").

on the facts of

individual

Although the district court had not had the benefit of

argument on the issue of whether a contractual provision was an
unenforceable penalty, the appellate court exercised its discretion
and considered the issue because it was an issue of law.
Colorado Interstate supra.

See

See also Stahmann Farms. Inc. v. U.S.,

624 F.2d 958, 961 (1980) (new issue may be heard where the question
is one of law and the failure to hear it results in the miscarriage
of justice).

8

In Utah, questions of contract interpretation are a matter of
law if they do not require extrinsic evidence.

Valley Bank and

Trust Co. v. U.S. Life Title Insurance Co. of Dallas, 776 P.2d 933,
935 (Utah App. 1989) .

Here, as Egelston has already noted, State

Farm failed to offer extrinsic evidence.

Moreover, every summary

judgment is reviewed for correctness as a matter of law.

See

Wineaar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991) . Thus, even if
the court considered ambiguity a new issue, it has the power to
consider it.
POINT III
STATE FARM FAILS TO ADDRESS THE POINTS MADE BY EGELSTON
State Farm's arguments rely primarily upon a statement made by
Egelston's

counsel

below,

coverage for motorcycles

agreeing

"that

in the language.

the

policy

. . . "

Appellee, p. 2 (citing R. 232-33) (emphasis added).
as State Farm

contends, an admission

accorded to this language.

as to the

excludes

See Br. of
This is not,

effect

to be

Rather, it is an acknowledgement that,

if one follows the painstaking definitional trail laid down by
State Farm, one arrives at language excluding motorcycles.
Egelston's brief on appeal acknowledges the very same thing.
Moreover, Egelston's counsel below further stated, "and the issue
is, does the law allow that when it comes to an operator."

Id.

The real point here, is that this exclusion must have been clear to

9

the insured when the policy was issued.
professionals

The fact that trained

-- including the injured party's attorney -- can

attempt to decipher the policy after-the-fact is irrelevant.

See

Sandt, 854 P.2d at 523-25; see also Loya v. State Farm Mut. Ins.
Co., 888 P.2d 447, 451 (N.M. 1994).
State Farm fails to explain how an average, reasonable insured
was to have understood this exclusion.

Instead, it argues that a

"motorcycle" is not a "car" as a matter of law (although it is a
"motor vehicle").

See Br. of Appellee, p. 10 (citing Bear River

Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wright, 880 P.2d 1019 (Utah App. 1989).

This

proves too much because a motorcycle is a "car" under State Farm's
policy for some purposes (i.e., if it is owned by the insureds).
The ambiguity arises from switching back and forth depending upon
which adjective appears in conjunction with the term "car."
Br. of Appellant, pp. 11-13.

See

State Farm offers no justification

for this confusing use of terminology.

It offers no explanation

for how a policy can clearly provide different types of coverage
with respect to motorcycles, but never expressly mention the term
"motorcycle."
State Farm also argues that the law

"makes a distinction

between . . . an 'owner's policy' and an 'operator's policy'."
of Appellee, p. 11.

Br.

Unfortunately, State Farm's policy does not

make such a distinction.

Moreover, the law does not require that

a policy provide only one type of coverage; but, that it must
10

provide at least one type. Thus, the fact that the policy provides
"owner" coverage does not exclude "operator" coverage.

State Farm

does not even address the point that the policy does not provide
full

"owner's"

coverage

for

permissive

users.

See

Br.

of

Appellant, p. 15.3
Most important, State Farm offers no explanation as to why it
could not have just said, straight-away, "this is an owner's policy" or "this is not an operator's policy," and "that means. . ."
State Farm's final argument
provide "additional coverage."

is that the law allows it to

Again, that is true, but (again)

what the law allows and what the policy at issue says are not
necessarily the same thing.
which is the

How is a reasonable layperson to know

"primary" coverage and which is the

"additional"

coverage -- particularly when the so-called "additional coverage
(for non-owned

cars)

Appellant, pp. 14-15.

comes

first

in the policy?

See Br. of

The policy does not specifically designate

different coverages as "primary" or "additional."
That is the fatal flaw in State Farm's policy.

It could have

easily expressed the exclusion upon which it relies in clear and
understandable terms.

In fact, Sandt requires it.

3

It could have

Surely this exclusion is as fatal to owner's coverage as the
exclusion for using someone else's motor vehicle as a "dwelling" is
fatal to operator's coverage.
See Br. of Appellee, p. 13.
Egelston will certainly agree that this policy fails to clearly
provide either type of required coverage in full.
11

said

"this

coverage."

is

an

owner's

policy"

and

"this

is

your

primary

It could have said "this is additional coverage" and

"your additional coverage does not apply to motorcycles."

The

fatal flaw in State Farm's argument is that it fails to explain why
it chose

the confusing

language used

in the policy

or how a

layperson is to comprehend it.
State Farm is correct about one thing -- a contract is not
ambiguous simply because the parties disagree as to what it means.
This is an objective inquiry, based upon how an average, reasonable
insured would understand the policy.
25.

See Sandt, 854 P.2d at 523-

The logical correlary is that a policy is not unambiguous just

because the insured and insurer appear to agree as to its meaning.
Here,

that

agreement

between

insurer

and

insured

can only be

inferred from Christensen's passivity in this litigation. Perhaps,
that is the most intriguing unanswered question -- if Christensen
knew and understood that a non-owned motorcycle was not covered,
why did State Farm need to sue him?

At the very least, why has he

not stipulated to that fact or signed an affidavit for purposes of
the summary judgment?

And, if he does disagree with State Farm,

why is he standing mute while his coverage disappears?
V.
CONCLUSION
Clearly, Egelston is either "in" or "out."
address the issue of construing the policy
12

Either she can

(which was presented

below) or she must be dismissed from the action without prejudice.
On the merits, it is apparent that the policy did not follow the
Utah

Supreme

unambiguous.

Court's

mandate

in

Sandt

by

being

clear

Thus, the summary judgment must be reversed.
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